日期：2023年3月16日（周四） 地点：学术会堂604会议室
开幕式
时间：8:50-9:00
致辞人：吴 溪教授（葡萄新京·尼威斯(中国)责任有限公司经理）
主持人：王彦超教授（葡萄新京·尼威斯(中国)责任有限公司副经理）
论文报告
时间：9:00-10:00
报告1：Sense of Community: Exploring the role of the sociality of incentives in a gamified platform for delivery riders
报告人：王观林（英国布里斯托大学）
摘要：The gamified incentive system is a defining feature of platform organisations. It involves many mechanics to monitor performance, such as leaderboards, points and levels and real-time performance information to create a gamified environment to motivate employees to keep working. We conducted semi-structured interviews with riders and a station manager from a large platform organisation in China to share their experiences of how this gamified incentive system shapes their motivation, performance, and relationship with peers. By using goal-setting theory and social comparison theory, our study sheds light on how different gamified mechanics motivate riders individually. Meanwhile, this gamified system also helps to create a collective sense of community which further incentivises their performance by mitigating the negative emotion potentially arising from individual incentives and potentially creating a positive impact on their performance. Further, insights from this paper bring some inspiration for management accounting researchers to further investigate how this sociality of incentives motivates employees in other incentive system settings.
时间：10:00-11:00
报告2：Inside the Minds of Expected Stock Returns
报告人：彭卓桢（新加坡南洋理工大学）
摘要：This paper conducts textual analysis on sell-side analyst reports and online stock opinion articles, which recommend that investors buy stocks that, based on prior literature, trade at comparatively high prices and earn low future returns. We test whether the justifications provided in these buy recommendations mostly (1) emphasize a stock’s safe-haven quality, (2) indicate investor exuberance, or (3) point to a preference for stocks with high upside potential. We find that the buy recommendations mostly emphasize stocks’ upside potential. Our results suggest that non-traditional investor preferences play a dominant role in explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns.
时间：11:00-12:00
报告3：The Spillover Effect of Information Disclosure on Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from the Registration-based Reform in China
报告人：刘瑞琳（清华大学）
摘要：Using the implementation of a registration-based IPO system reform in China in 2019, this paper examines the spillover effect of IPO firms’ information disclosure on existing public firms’ precision of management forecasts. Contrary to other countries where management earnings forecast (MEF) is voluntary disclosure, MEF disclosure in China is largely mandatory. We find that the precision of MEFs significantly decreases when peer IPO firms disclose more information. We test and find that the competitive pressure hypothesis and the information transfer hypothesis explain the negative peer effects on the precision of MEFs. The findings in this paper contribute to a better understanding of MEF disclosure and document an unintended cost of mandatory disclosure policy in emerging market.
